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 ?The Populist Catharsis: On the Revival of the Political ? 
Author: Albena Azmanova, University of Kent (A.Azmanova@kent.ac.uk) 
 
The upsurge of populist movements and the entry of populist parties into parliaments and 
governments over the last decade has been condemned as being the cause of the sorry 
state of democratic politics in western societies. As populism erodes the liberal political 
culture of consensus-building through deliberation that achieves inclusive diversity, the 
verdict goes, it undercuts the very foundation of liberal democracies. Taking my distance 
from this diagnosis of our current predicament, I will argue that populism is not the cause of 
the erosion of diversity capital, it is its outcome. I will examine the hypothesis that populism 
is the symptom of a pathological state of the political in contemporary democracies. 
Focusing on the process of politicization of social grievances, I will offer a diagnosis of the 
state of the political in the early twenty-first century, in order to discern populism's capacity 
to reboot democratic politics. 
 
1. The political in all its states  
The recent populist upsurge that propelled to power a Donald Trump in the US or an Alexis 
Tsipras in Greece, has been celebrated or bemoaned, depending on the model of the 
political from the perspective of which the anti-establishment protest is being viewed. I 
draw on Claude Lefort ?Ɛ conceptualisation of the political as a sphere of ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?Ɛsymbolic 
representation of its unity to itself, a symbolic order ŽĨƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌŶĞƐƐĨƌŽŵǁŚŝĐŚ
authority is sourced. 1 In modern society, Lefort observes, this order is destabilized and 
pluralized, which leads him to assert that modern democracy is being constituted by an 
empty space. tŚŝůĞĞŶĚŽƌƐŝŶŐ>ĞĨŽƌƚ ?Ɛ conceptualization of the political, I take some 
distance from his particular diagnosis of the democratic form of the political as an empty 
space. In what follows, I will elaborate on some of the key features of the democratic state 
of the political which will serve as a matrix for a critique of the recent populist insurgency.  
                                                          
1 /ĨŝŶĚ:ĂŵĞƐ/ŶŐƌĂŵ ?ƐƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ>ĞĨŽƌƚ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƚŽďĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĂƉƚ P “ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐƵŶŝƚǇďǇƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝŶŐŝƚŽŶƚŽĂƉŽŝŶƚŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞ ?>ĞĨŽƌƚ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐĂƐĂ
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Let us proceed from the observation that, in the context of modernity, the political is 
no longer given or inherited from the past, but actively generated. According to the 
accounts authors offer of the dynamics of this on-going production of the political, two 
broad schools of thought have taken shape. I will call them  ‘the orthodox ? and  ‘the radical ? 
perspectives.  
Within the orthodox one, spanning from Plato through the social contract and the 
natural law traditions and emanating in the familiar academic interpretations and 
appropriations of John Rawls ?ǁŽƌŬ, authority is sourced from shared principles (such as 
human rights, or constitutional essentials) to be protected from politics. /ŶZĂǁůƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?
the locus of the political is a shared political conception of justice which is not derived from 
any particular worldviews (what he calls  ‘comprehensive doctrines ?ŽĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚůŝĨĞ), nor is it 
a compromise among them. It is, instead, freestanding -- its content is set out independently 
of the comprehensive doctrines that citizens hold, and is sourced from the shared 
fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture of society. Significantly, the shared 
political conception of justice is not generated through contestations and conflicts among 
the particular and particularistic worldviews. This conception can gain citizens ? free and 
reasoned endorsement in judgment (Rawls 1993, 100 W101), because they share the capacity 
of being reasonable. David Rasmussen reminds us, ŝŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐZĂǁůƐ ?Ɛ account of the 
political, that public reason as the voice of the political  “almost has its own claim to truth in 
the sense that if the comprehensive doctrines cannot abide by it they are labeled as 
unreasonable ? (2012:461). tŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŽƌƚŚŽĚŽǆ ?ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĞpolitical is produced via 
dynamics of cooperation on these core principles and is ruled by the voice of the 
reasonable. The state is a seat of political intelligence, and politics is reduced  “to a set of 
ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚůǇƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůŵŽǀĞƐĂŶĚŶĞƵƚƌĂůƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ? ?DŽƵĨĨĞ 2005, 34).  
From this perspective on the political, the current populist mobilizations are an 
onslaught on the normative consensus underpinning the liberal constitutional order and 
with that  W on the political itself. Members of these movements and their leaders are 
derided as lacking the intelligence to enact, nay, to know, the basic rules of reasonable 
political behavior  W they are thus a  ‘ďĂƐŬĞƚof deplorables ?, as the aspiring leader of the free 
world put it during the 2016 U.S. presidential race.2 Populism is feared for the enmity it 
brings; populists are denied validity as political actors because they are triggering 
divisiveness and resentment, tearing society apart.  
The alternative,  ‘radical view ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůis present in the writings of Niccolò 
Machiavelli, Karl Marx and Carl Schmitt and has found contemporary resurgence in the work 
of Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and 6ODYRMäLåHN The political is the realm not of what is 
placed beyond disagreement, but exactly the opposite  W it is the realm of that which is 
                                                          
2 Democratic Party nominee Hillary Clinton used the phrase in a 2016 presidential election campaign 
fundraising event on 9 September 2016, referring to some supporters of her opponent, Republican Party 
nominee Donald Trump.  Reported on BBC news on 10 Sept. 2016 (http://www.bbc.com/news/av/election-us-
2016-37329812/clinton-half-of-trump-supporters-basket-of-deplorables; accessed on 11 Dec. 2017) 
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contested.3 The adversarial nature of the production of the political, the clash of political 
identities, is its key feature. Conflict, not cooperation is its constitutive dynamic. This view 
celebrates at least some forms of populism as it sees them as a valuable catalyst in the 
resurrection of the political. ƐƌŶĞƐƚŽ>ĂĐůĂƵŚĂƐƉƵƚŝƚ ? “WŽƉƵůŝƐŵŝƐ ?ƋƵŝƚĞƐŝŵƉůǇ ?ĂǁĂǇŽĨ
constructing the political (2005: xi). Moreover, these insurrectory moments of conflict 
perpetuate the endless logic of challenge that keeps democracy alive. As Chantal Mouffe 
ŶŽƚĞƐ ? “ ?Ă ? pluralist liberal democratic society does not deny the existence of conflicts, but 
provides the institutions allowing them to be expressed in an adversarial form ? (2005:30). It 
is noteworthy that even the most derided forms of recent populist mobilizations (those by 
the anti-immigrant far right) have used successfully the channels of electoral politics, which 
has allowed them to affect not only specific policies, but to influence the whole policy 
agenda in western democracies. Fear from losing the electoral competition to populist 
parties has effectively forced many center-left and center-right parties to absorb, and 
thereby mainstream, the anti-foreigner sentiment mobilized by right-wing populism. Anti-
austerity protests across Europe are replacing the firm policy consensus on the inevitability 
of austerity politics for financial stabilization by a debate on the social costs and economic 
effectiveness of these policies. Thus, hosted by the institutional framework of liberal 
democracies, the radical voice of populism is having a real political purchase; it is effectively 
regenerating the dynamics of democratic politics.  
Both the orthodox and the radical verdicts are in some ways right, but are also 
deficient in helping us understand the peculiarities of the recent populist insurrection. The 
radical democratic celebration of populism on grounds of its reviving the adversarial 
dynamics of the political obscures the illiberal, even totalitarian, instincts of the populist 
upsurge; the orthodox model overlooks that its own elitism is one of the triggers of 
populism.  
We need a notion of the political that allows us to discern the emancipatory from 
the harmful features of the latest eruption of populism. In seeking to articulate such a 
notion, I propose we go back to the drawing board, and define the phenomenon we now 
label  ‘ƉŽƉƵůŝƐŵ ?via the peculiarity of its historical context  W the capitalist democracies of the 
early twenty-first century.  
 
2. KƵƌĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?ƐƵŶĐŽŵŵŽŶƉŽƉƵůŝƐŵ 
Three features mark the new populism  W (1) its rise in the affluent last decade of the 
twentieth century, (2) the economic nature of its xenophobic bias, (3) its criticism of free 
and open markets and related calls for social protection; (4) the appeals it formulates for 
responsible and accountable rule. Let me address these four features in turn.  
                                                          
3 DŽƵĨĨĞ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ?ǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? ? ? ?Ǉ ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?/ŵĞĂŶƚŚĞĚŝ ĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨĂŶƚĂŐŽŶŝƐŵǁŚŝĐŚ/ƚĂŬĞƚŽďĞ
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞďǇ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?/ŵĞĂŶƚŚĞƐĞƚŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐĂŶĚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚĂŶ
order is created, orgĂŶŝǌŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶĐŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƵĂůŝƚǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ? 
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While the rise of populism is usually a consequence of economic malaise and 
political turmoil (as in Nazi Germany of the 1930s), the current wave of anti-immigrant and 
anti-establishment sentiment emerged in the  ‘roaring 1990s ?, in conditions of robust growth 
(except for Germany), rising living standards and low unemployment. It was particularly 
spread in affluent and egalitarian societies such as France, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, 
and Switzerland. Thus, a first notable peculiarity is that anti-establishment attitudes were 
not triggered by the economic crises, they preceded it.   
A second peculiarity of this new populism is that anti-immigrant attitudes, even if 
they were verbalized as hostility to  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ?(predominantly Muslim) cultures, were not 
driven exclusively by the political chauvinism and cultural arrogance that defined the post-
WWII extreme right.  In the standard version of xenophobia propagated by far-right parties 
in the course of the 20th century, hostility to foreigners was cast as a matter of protection of 
cultural and political sovereignty (national chauvinism). In contrast, the new xenophobia has 
a strongly economic component related to perceived threats to socio-economic wellbeing 
(job loss and pressures on the redistributive resources of the state) brought about by open 
borders.  We might recall the ƉƌŽƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ ‘WŽůŝƐŚWůƵŵďĞƌ ? ?Ă
symbol of cheap labour coming from Central Europe) during the 2005 EU Constitutional 
referendum in France  W a position voiced by political forces across the left-right divide in 
their opposition to further EU integration.  
This brings us to the third characteristic of the new populism: even when expressed 
by nominally far-right formations, it contains a call for social protection. Telling in this regard 
is that well-established parties of the far right, such as the French Front National, and the 
Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid, have abandoned their original endorsement of free markets 
and are now embracing social protectionism as well as trade protectionism  W typically 
policies of the Left.  This hostile stance to free and open markets is new for the far right and 
has been recorded only since the late 1990s.   
These attitudes were sharpened by the 2007-2009 economic crisis, but were not 
generated by it. They emerged in the affluent 1990s  W a decade of rapid liberalization of 
domestic markets and opening them to free trade. Governments across the left-right 
ideological spectrum pursued these policies as part of the neoliberal policy consensus that 
predicates economic prosperity on competitiveness in the global economy.4 This coincided 
with the proliferation of corruption and mismanagement scandals allowing populist leaders 
(from Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands, to Jörg Haider in Austria and Jean-Marie Le Pen in 
France) to mobilize unprecedented support by alleging that the establishment was reaping 
the benefits of the growing prosperity yet leaving society in ruins. A common denominator 
of populist mobilisations in Europe is their anti-EU attitude, expressed in ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨh ?Ɛ
                                                          
4 The neoliberal policy package consists in deregulation of product and labour markets, privatisation 
of public assets and industries, and opening of domestic markets for trade and foreign investment, 
usually justified as a means to ensure the competitiveness of national economies, rather than, as in 
the paradigm of the Welfare State consensus  W to enable economic growth and redistribution. 
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bureaucratic, unaccountable rule. Thus, the fourth feature of new populism comes into view 
 W calls for accountable and democratic rule.  
The anti-austerity protests that erupted at the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial 
meltdown are indicative of the peculiar link, in the formation of new public attitudes, 
between popular anger against impoverishment, on one hand, and the rebuke of the 
political establishment, on the other. These were not protests of disappointed consumers, 
venting their frustration at elites sheltered from the public malaise. Surveys have registered 
that the indignation has to do not with austerity itself but rather with the manner in which it 
was imposed  W not as a result of a cyclical economic crisis necessitating belt-tightening, but 
ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?ďĂŝůŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨďĂŶŬƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞĐƵƚƚŝŶŐĚŽǁŶpublic spending (EU 
ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ďŽƌĞƚŚĞĐŽƐƚŽĨ ? ? ?ƚƌŝůůŝŽŶĞƵƌŽďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ?Ănd 2011 for the bank bailout).  In 
this sense, the real grievance behind the anti-austerity protests is therefore not 
impoverishment, but unfairness in the distribution of economic and social benefits and 
losses in dealing with the economic crisis. This was a reaction not simply against the 
economic privileges of elites, but against a pattern of socially irresponsible rule (Azmanova 
2013: 24-25), that is, rule in pursuit of sound economic objectives (i.e. stabilisation of public 
finances) without regard for the societal consequences of these economic policies.  
Thus, since the close of the twentieth century, a wide-spread anxiety in affluent 
western societies emerged, based on perceptions that policies of open borders have 
brought in physical insecurity, political disorder, cultural estrangement, and employment 
insecurity due to employment flexibilization, job outsourcing, or loss of jobs to immigrants. 
These became the four ingredients of a new order-and-security public agenda that has 
dramatically reshaped the ideological landscape of liberal democracies. What has been 
mislabelled ĂƐ ‘populism ? are in fact mobilisations around this new public agenda of social 
concerns. In this sense, the ƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘populism ? is erroneous.  
Let me offer further validation to this claim examining the anti-establishment 
mobilisations against core features of populism. Ernesto Laclau ŚĂƐŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶĂŶŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ
whole exercise of trying to identify the universal contents of populism (2005:15); rather 
than a commitment to a set of values, ideological positions, and demands for policies, 
populism is a political logic of drawing an antagonistic frontier in the construction of a 
political subject. Thus, a distinctive ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƉŽƉƵůŝƐŵŝƐŝƚƐ ‘negative politics ? (Max Weber) 
of hostile confrontation without a coherent programmatic stance and with no credible 
ambition to govern.5 By all evidence, this is not the case with the far-right and radical-left 
formations of our times, which are expressing a distinct set of public demands related to the 
                                                          
5 This purely reactive stance of populism is noted by most of (Judis 2016, Müller 2016). Weber (1994) uses the 
term to describe the limited functions of the pre-WWI Reichstag, noting it had adopted a reactive behaviour as 
it had powers only to block the government, rather than sharing in its work and in the control of the 
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞďǇďĞŝŶŐ “ĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚĨƌŽŵƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?ŽŶůǇ “ĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶ
 ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞůĞĂĚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶůŝŬĞƐŽŵĞŚŽƐƚŝůĞƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?ŝďŝĚ ?Ăƚ ? ? ?).   
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order-and-security agenda (from restrictive immigration policy to reforming trade 
agreements), and are persistently making their way into parliaments and governments. 
Rather than simply endorsing the negative politics of protest and confrontation with 
political elites, the new populism is a structured and enduring mobilisation of social forces 
against two features of the established order: (1) the style of policy-making-- technocratic 
rule bereft of political leadership and (2) its content  W neoliberal global economic 
competition without regard for the social consequences of economic policy (what I 
described as  ‘socially irresponsible rule ?). They typically formulate a policy agenda for 
accountable and democratic policy making (e.g. calls for restraining the power of 
corporations and the political establishment), revising trade agreements in view of 
protection of the national labour market, as well as curbing immigration (this last being a 
distinctive feature of right-wing populism). One does not need to endorse all of these policy 
positions to admit that they form a proper policy platform, surpassing the  ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?
of classical populism.   
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ/ĨŝŶĚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ƉŽƉƵůŝƐŵ ?ŵŝƐleading in describing these political 
mobilisations, this term has gained so much currency in identifying them as a collective 
object of analysis, that I find myself compelled to continue using it, with a slight alteration. 
Henceforth, I will refer to the phenomenon as  ‘ŶĞǁƉŽƉƵůŝƐŵ ? ? 
 
3. New populism as a pathology of the political 
 
I will proceed to investigate some peculiarities of new populism in order to distinguish 
between its emancipatory and its reactionary potentials.  I noted that in the course of the 
last two decades, a new agenda of social sensibilities and public demands took shape. It 
might be useful to recall that electoral politics is a mechanism for meeting public demands 
for policy action addressed to the government, with political supply of policies offered by 
parties. At least this is how electoral politics in democracies is supposed to work  W it allows 
publics to have input into policy, as well as policy-makers to inform and shape public 
attitudes. I will claim that this mechanism of meeting public demand with political supply 
has malfunctioned, initiating the original crisis of democracy to which new populism now 
gives but expression. From this perspective, I will argue, populism is a phenomenon of 
disarticulation of dynamics taking place on the level of social structure into the political 
field.6 Let me address this in some detail. 
As a result of the new public demands regarding the social effect of the neoliberal 
policy agenda, the ideological landscape of western democracies has changed.  Throughout 
the twentieth century, the ideological map of capitalist democracies was configured along 
the left-right divide, itself determined by the clustering of preferences along a cultural and 
                                                          
6 I am grateful to James Ingram for suggesting to me this formulation of my hypothesis during a meeting of the 
Radical Critical Theory Circle in Nisyros (Greece), in the summer of 2017 
  7 
 
an economic axes. The economic one spanned from regulated economy to free market 
economy; the cultural -- from liberal to conservative values. Since the turn of the new 
century, a novel configuration has emerged. As ruling elites across the ideological spectrum 
came to embrace free markets, the relevant economic divide concerns market openness and 
spans from open to closed domestic markets, rather than from free to regulated economies. 
The cultural axis of ideological divisions has also changed  W it pits cosmopolitanism against 
sovereigntism/patriotism, which obliterates the liberal-vs- conservative divide along which 
the culture wars of the preceding two centuries took place. Consequently, the left-right 
cleavage that had structured the ideological landscape of modern societies since the French 
revolution is being replaced by a new one: public preferences for cosmopolitanism and 
international economic integration are clustering around a new pole (which I have named 
an Opportunity pole), pitted against preferences for cultural and economic protection (a 
Risk pole). These new clustering of public preferences along an opportunity-risk divide 
determined by attitudes to the new economy of open borders and technological innovation  
began to take shape already at the close of the last century (Azmanova 2004, 2010, 2011).   
How has political supply responded to the new set of public demands? In the period 
spanning the last two decades of the twentieth century to this day, the decisional power has 
been held by the Opportunity pole  W an alliance of forces (center-left and center-right 
political elites and opinion-makers) that enforced the neoliberal policy consensus, united 
around the infamous TINA policy logic.7 Since this policy was deemed to be without 
alternative and therefore not a matter of ideological contestation, it could be enforced 
through purportedly apolitical technocratic measures, and by a political class of professional 
administrators trained in elite schools.  This was meant to be a meritocracy  W the best 
educated and capable govern, equipped by a science of politics  W an unchallengeable 
governing know-how. However, this rule came to be experienced as an elitist method of 
population management without political leadership  W rule that ŚĂƐůŽƐƚƚŽƵĐŚǁŝƚŚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?
interests and demands. Michael Young, the British sociologist who coined the term 
meritocracy in a 1958 satirical novel, described the meritocratic society as a world of 
arrogant winners and desperate losers (Young 1958).8   
These dynamics have had a peculiar impact on the political. Under the TINA policy 
regime, the space of the political was not filled with the symbolism of magnanimous 
political engineering of a bright future, as was the case under the bureaucratic  ‘socialism ? of 
East and Central Europe after WWII. Neither did the technê of expert rule, untainted by left-
right ideological battles, suffocate the political, as the  ‘post-politics ? hypothesis postulates. 
As Nancy Fraser (2017a) has reminded us, the neoliberal era of the past three decades was 
marked by the rise of new social movements (feminism, anti-racism, multiculturalism and 
                                                          
7  ‘d/E ?ŝƐĂŶĂĐƌŽŶǇŵĨŽƌdŚĞƌĞ/ƐEŽůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ W a policy stance Margaret Thatcher launched in the 1980, 
meaning that there could not be a challenge to the combination of free and open markets  W a formula which 
launched globalisation on the policy terms of neoliberal capitalism. 
8 Significantly, Tony Blair, former British Labour Prime Minister, proudly endorsed the term, without 
having read the book, one should hope. 
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LGBTQ rights), which allows Fraser to speaŬŽĨ ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ?. These 
mobilisations were far from insignificant in their scope and in their policy impact.  
However, I contend that the space of political contestation has shrunk, as 
experiences of suffering resulting from the economic policy consensus were depoliticised. 
Since economic liberalisation and market integration were deemed to be without 
alternative, the social fallout from these policies could not become an object of politics and 
therefore became politically unthinkable. In other words, grievances of suffered injustice 
from policies of global market competition had no place in the sphere of concerns that 
could be addressed in the political public sphere, that is, via a set of policies. As the social 
consequences of neoliberal economic policy could not be a valid object of political 
contestation, the sphere of the political as a realm of politically significant shared concerns 
contracted.  
Moreover, social critique and progressive politics in the neoliberal era became 
complicit in this shrinking of the space of the political. Political contestation took place 
almost exclusively in terms of demands for access to the system of democratic capitalism 
(e.g. labour market entry for women and ethnic minorities, political inclusion and activation 
of the poor, opening the marriage contract to non-heterosexual couples) and equality within 
that system (e.g. closing the gender gap in remuneration, granting proper recognition to 
ethnic, racial and other minorities). In a word  W the grand cause of the Left under 
neoliberalism was that of doing away with the unequal distribution of power in society, 
ǁŚĂƚ/ŚĂǀĞĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?injustice (resulting from the domination of 
one group over another by force of the former having greater material or symbolic 
resources in comparison to the latter (Azmanova 2012: 48, 144).  Missing, in this prevailing 
perspective of progressive politics, is critique and criticism of the operational dynamics of 
capitalism  W the competitive production of profit that became unfettered and further 
intensified in the neoliberal era. These dynamics of capitalism produced systemic forms of 
injustice and domination such as the increasing precariousness of livelihoods across the 
class divide. These injustices, however, dropped out of the remit of intellectual notice.9  
Both in terms of political mobilization and intellectual critique, the Left struggled for 
equality and inclusion within the system of social relations, but failed to question and 
challenge the system into which entry was requested and within which equality was sought. 
From a different perspective, Nancy Fraser (2017a; 2017b) has observed the formation of a 
neoliberal ideological hegemony on the basis of a broad-based consent (in Gramscian terms) 
on a liberal, cosmopolitan ethos, in turn effecting a shift from concerns with equality to 
concerns with meritocracy.  
                                                          
9 I first discussed these two forms of injustice within the dichotomy relational-vs-structural forms of 
domination (Azmanova 2012); upon NaŶĐǇ&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ů ůĂƚĞƌƌĞůĂďĞůůĞĚ ‘ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů ?ĂƐ
 ‘ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐ ? ?ǌŵĂŶŽǀĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚŚĂǀĞŵŽƌĞƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇĂĚŽƉƚĞĚ ƚƌŝĂĚŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ P ‘ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůĂŶĚƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐ ?ĨŽƌŵƐŽĨŝŶũƵƐƚŝĐĞĂŶĚĚŽmination (Azmanova 2016). 
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As a result of this, it became impossible to politicize those grievances of the Risk pole 
that were related to the social impact of neoliberal economic policy (i.e. the dynamics of 
competitive profit production). These people became effectively disenfranchised: they did 
not have a voice, even as they did have a vote  Wthis vote could not be cast against 
something that was not on the political agenda set by center-left and center-right 
incumbents. Moreover, the ruling elites denied the forces mobilizing around the Risk pole 
validity as political actors  W they were dismissed ĂƐ ‘ƉŽƉƵůŝƐƚƐ ? ?their demands were deemed 
implausible, their leaders were disparaged as ignorant and uncivilised. The hubris of the 
liberal elite, and the hostile posture it has taken against its nemesis (the forces of the Risk 
pole), is well illustrated by the gesture of center-left parties in Europe to claim for 
themselves tŚĞůĂďĞů ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞĨŽƌĐĞƐ ? ?ŝŵƉůǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌŝǀĂůŝƐƚŚĞƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ
and retrograde force (note that neither the left-right divide, nor the radicalism- 
conservatism one attributes to the adversary such a denigrating connotation).  
This indicates that peculiar dynamics of political animosity are currently at play. 
Throughout the history of populism, politics of rejection and blocking ( ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?in 
tĞďĞƌ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐ ?has been initiated by the diverse masses united in their anger against 
political elites ?ƵƐƵĂůůǇŝŶƚŝŵĞƐŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐƌŝƐŝƐ ?/ŶŽƵƌƚŝŵĞƐŽĨ ‘ŶĞǁƉŽƉƵůŝƐŵ ? ?it is the 
diverse elites that have united in their disdain for those voters who seem to be impervious 
to the political common sense of neoliberal politics  W an attitude that emerged at least a 
decade before the great recession of 2007-2009 set it.  Per Jan-tĞƌŶĞƌDƺůůĞƌ ?Ɛ (2016) 
widely used analysis, populism is marked by three features: it is critical of elites, it is anti-
ƉůƵƌĂůŝƐƚĂŶĚŚĂƐĂŵŽƌĂůĐůĂŝŵŽĨƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ƚŽƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ‘ƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ? ?10 
However, in the neoliberal context these characteristics are also shared by the ruling class: it 
is critical of the masses (e.g. Trump voters, as well as those who supported Brexit, are 
usually described as either ignorant or gullible), it is anti-pluralist (center-right and center-
left elites share similar upbringing, worldviews and positions on economic policy), and has a 
moral claim of representing all ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?Ɛrepresentable sections (that is, all except the 
populists).11 These elites ? derogative use ŽĨƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶ ‘ƉŽƉƵůŝƐŵ ?ŝƐ a summary illustration 
of the reverse logics of negative politics that marks our century.  
In clarifying this point, it might be helpful to recall that ƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶ ‘populism ? in the 
current usage of the term has the nature of what Reinhart Koselleck has called an 
 ‘asymmetrical counter-concept ? (or  ‘ƵŶĞƋƵĂůůǇĂŶƚŝƚŚĞƚŝĐĂů ? ?: a concept that expresses an 
inequality in the distribution of power, a social asymmetry: e.g. Hellenes' vs. 'Barbarians', 
'Christians' vs. 'Pagans', the enlightened publics vs. the basket of deplorables. The most 
important characteristic of asymmetrical counter-concepts is that  “one's own position is 
                                                          
10 In an significant derogation from this definition, the supporters of Donald Trump in the US are not critical of 
elites, but of the establishment (i.e. ruling elites); they are infatuated by Trump exactly as a figure of the 
business elite. I am grateful to Angelina Ilieva for prompting me to make this important clarification.  
11 Symptomatic of this is the refusal of center-left and center-right parties in Europe to form 
coalitions with far-right and radical-left formations, which contrasts with the willingness for left-right 
co-ŚĂďŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐĞǀĞƌƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƌŝƐĞŽĨ ‘ŐƌĂŶĚĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂĨƚĞƌtt// ? 
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readily defined by criteria which make it possible for the resulting counter-position to be 
only ŶĞŐĂƚĞĚ ?(Koselleck 2004: 159). Indeed, wiƚŚƚŚĞŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞůĂďĞů ‘ƉŽƉƵůŝƐm ? ? the self-
ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ‘progressive ? forces uniting around the Opportunity pole effectively deny those 
mobilizing around the Risk pole the reciprocity of mutual recognition. This means that the 
diversity capital of liberal democracies was dramatically diminished much before the recent 
upsurge of populist mobilizations; it was eroded in the course of the three decades of trans-
ideological consensus in pursuit of global competitiveness.  
 
When breaking the silence on the negative social effect of neoliberal politics, the 
recent populist ĞƌƵƉƚŝŽŶĞŶůĂƌŐĞƐƚŚĞƐƉŚĞƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇƚŚŝŶŬĂďůĞ ? ?dŚƵƐ ?ƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůŝƐƚ
gesture is above all an invocation of the Right to Politics  W the right to matter politically, to 
have one's experience of social injustice count as a public concern and therefore to merit 
policy action.12 In this gesture, the populist upheaval, be it inadvertently, is pulling 
democracy out of its state of crisis by striking at the hubris of policy-making as political 
technê. This is a moment of catharsis, of a release of supressed grievances; eventually, this 
enlarging of the scope of the political and its re-energising through novel ideological 
conflicts could trigger a democratic revival  W under specific conditions which I address a bit 
later. Before I turn to the conditions enabling such a revival (that is, of a shift from catharsis 
to constructive transformation), let me revisit the issue of the democratic state of the 
political.  
My narrative on the mobilization of the Risk pole of the new ideological divide 
already deploys a third model of the political  W one that is alternative to both ƚŚĞ ‘ŽƌƚŚŽĚŽǆ ?
one based on consensus shielded from politics, as well as the radical one based on 
adversarial combat. Within this third model, the political emerges as a sphere of shared 
concerns with injustice (rather than a shared conception of justice) that is permanently 
generated via a contestation of the existing binding rules and norms. From the radical take 
on the political I retain the idea of contestation, but propose to direct the practice of 
contestation against rules generating and sustaining injustice, rather than against social or 
political actors (individuals, parties, foreign peoples and states). This is a contestatory, but 
                                                          
12 /ĚĞƌŝǀĞƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĨƌŽŵĞŶŐĂĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ^ĞǇůĂĞŶŚĂďŝď ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ
 ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞr to stress the importance for grievances, voiced in the course of social 
mobilisation and political participation, to have a political purchase, to matter politically (Azmanova 
2016). dŚŝƐƚĂŬĞŽŶƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŝƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŝĞŶŶĞĂůŝďĂƌ ?Ɛ understanding of it, 
developed in Equaliberty ?,ĞĚĞƌŝǀĞƐŝƚĨƌŽŵƌĞŶĚƚ ?Ɛ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŚĂǀĞƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ŝŶŽƌĚer to highlight the 
need for inclusion in a political community as an active subject of politics. While the two 
understandings of the notion have many affinities (regarding the concern with agency), my stress is 
on the conditions for effective politicisation of social grievances, once a person (a group) is provided 
access to and inclusion within a community. dŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ŝƐĂĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĚĞǀŝƐĞ to 
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not an adversarial state of the political. In the process of on-going contestation of the 
established normative order, a shared societal understanding emerges of what counts as a 
valid concern with injustice, even if no positive idea of justice is attained. This allows for 
experiences of social injustice (e.g. related to job outsourcing and robotization) to be 
recognized not simply as having moral validity, but also to acquire urgent political saliency  W 
to compel not just compassion, but also policy action.  
How does the current populist upsurge look from the perspective of this 
understanding of the proper democratic state of the political? As I noted, the grievances 
articulated around the Risk pole of ideological alignment, grievances related to the social 
consequences of neoliberal economic policy (impoverishment and precariousness), had 
been for some time politically silenced  W they had been refused saliency as proper political 
concerns.  Because the TINA policy consensus does not admit of an alternative economic 
policy, it renders the social outcomes of this policy politically irrelevant, even if they have 
intense validity in terms of personal experiences of suffered harm. In other words the state 
of the political under the reign of TINA did not allow for morally valid grievances to be 
politicized ŝŶƚŽĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚǁŚĂƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶůĂďĞůůĞĚ ‘ƉŽƉƵůŝƐŵ ?
is a result of the disarticulation of that which happens on the level of social structure into 
the political field. 
From this perspective, the populist eruption is a call for adjustment, for proper 
articulation of social experiences of suffered injustice into politically valid claims to justice. 
The outcries of the new populism surely create a crisis of the established system; by 
demanding an alternative to the TINA logic, they reveal the contingent nature of the 
neoliberal consensus. These outcries do even more: they enlarge the realm of the political 
by validating a new set of grievance  W ones related to neoliberal globalisation -- as politically 
relevant. In this sense, the populist eruption serves as a catalyst for the democratization of 
the political.  
The adjustment (political articulation) for which populism calls can take place along 
two trajectories. These trajectories are shaped by the manner in which political supply 
reacts to public demand, or put differently  W the way the political leadership frames both 
the reasons for the grievances and the range of policy solutions. One trajectory is a radical 
change in the nature of economic policy away from the neoliberal consensus of privatization 
of public assets and deregulation of product- and labor- markets (as in the policy platforms 
advanced by Bernie Sanders in the U.S., Jeremy Corbyn in the U.K. and Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon in France. This would effectively address the structural sources of the populist 
discontent. The alternative trajectory is that of short-term crisis management such as 
curbing immigration and hampering globalization. This, however, is the road of political mis-
articulation of the grievances into policy answers which do not provide effective solutions to 
the structural causes of the grievances of the Risk pole. However, these solutions sounds 
more plausible (and thus recruit more easily popular support) because they do not 
necessitate a radical break with the neoliberal order.  As significantly altering the course of 
economic policy continues to be considered politically unthinkable, claims to policy action 
take the shape of demands for a feasible alternative: territorial closure enacted via 
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ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ P “We will follow two simple rules: buy American 
ĂŶĚŚŝƌĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ ? ? “ƌŝƚŝƐŚũŽďƐĨŽƌƌŝƚŝƐŚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ?13 This criticism of the global turn of 
capitalism detracts from the injustices produced by the very systemic dynamics of 
capitalism.  
In this scenario, the crisis is perpetuated into a  ‘ĐƌŝƐŝƐŽĨĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? W the leading political 
actors institutionalize the crisis by means of short term fixes of the system  W e.g. shutting 
out asylum seekers, or building a Globalisation Fund, as the EU has done, which provides 
short-term financial respite to workers who have lost their jobs to global markets. The 
positive potential of the populist challenge is thus wasted; the catharsis does not ensue 
democratic reconstruction.  
In this situation, the political seems to be brought back to life, as the technocratic 
political peace has given way to new ideological conflicts. However, these very conflicts are 
an expression of the pathological state of the political.  “EŝWĂƚƌŝĞEŝƉĂƚƌŽŶ ?ŽŶǀĂƵƚŵŝĞǆ
ƋƵĞĐĂ ?  ? “EĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚĞ&ĂƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚ ?ŶŽƌƚŚĞŽƐƐ ?ǁĞĚĞƐĞƌǀĞďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĂƚ ? ?, proclaimed 
the French high school students in their protests during the second round of the French 
presidential elections in 2017 that pitted the nationalist Marie Le Pen against the 
economically liberal globalist Emanuel Macron. We should hear them. Technocratic policy- 
making is being indeed challenged by the revival of political conflict. Yet the return of 
adversarial combat is neither a guarantee that democracy has recovered its health nor that 
TINA is dead. The warfare between histrionic patriotism and cool neoliberalism now 
unfolding on the political stage of western democracies is not a resurrection of the political 
into a democratic condition; these new ideological conflicts do not take place on a plane of 
shared concerns with injustice to which rival ideologies offer solutions competing for public 
endorsement. The Risk and Opportunity poles might demarcate the space of national 
politics, yet their supporters do not inhabit the same social space. They have therefore 
nothing to say to each other.   
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